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Different Behavioral Explanations of the Neolithic Transition from 
Foraging to Agriculture: A Review 
 
ABSTRACT 
This article examines how well two parallel behavioral approaches, one in economics 
and the other in anthropology, explain the economic evolution of Neolithic societies, 
particularly their transit from foraging to agriculture. Both assume rational optimizing 
behavior. It is argued that satisficing theories provide a superior explanation of 
transition (and non-transition) by some hunter-gatherers. Furthermore, many of the 
concepts associated with neoclassical economics are shown to be inadequate for 
analyzing the choice problems involved. Moreover, it is argued that all behavioral 
theories considering the relationship between human behavior and economic evolution 
need to pay attention to the way that decision-making is embedded in social structures. 
It is unlikely that a single theory will be able to explain the economic evolution of all 
societies when social structures and other relevant variables differ between 
communities.  
Keywords: Economic evolution; economic optimization; human behavioral ecology; 
hunter-gatherers; Neolithic Revolution; satisficing behavior, social embedding. 
JEL Classification: D01, O10, P00, Q10 
  
 
 
 
 
Different Behavioral Explanations of the Neolithic Transition from 
Foraging to Agriculture: A Review 
1. Introduction 
Weisdorf (2005) uses comparative microeconomic analysis to explain and integrate 
different theories (mostly proposed by anthropologists and archaeologists) of why 
several Neolithic societies began switching from exclusively depending on hunting and 
gathering for their livelihood to engaging in some agriculture and becoming eventually, 
in many cases, highly reliant on it. Seemingly unaware of Weisdorf’s comparative static 
analysis (because they do not refer to it), the anthropologists, Winterhalder and Kennett 
(2006, p. 11), extoll the virtue of using (modern) microeconomic concepts to explain the 
transition of foraging societies to agriculture. This type of approach is classified in the 
anthropological literature as part of human behavioral ecology.  
Those who adopt this approach (for example, Winterhalder and Smith, 1992; Smith and 
Winterhalder, 1992) draw on evolutionary ecology to support it in conjunction with 
optimization analysis. Smith and Winterhalder (1992, p. 52) state that ‘optimization 
analysis is a convenient heuristic tool or simplication for analyzing evolutionary 
outcomes.’ They specifically reject satisficing models mainly on the basis that those 
who fail to optimize will be eliminated by competition generated by those who 
optimize(Smith and Winterhalder, 1992, p. 54). Most of the types of arguments 
advanced by Smith and Winterhalder (1992) in favor of optimization models as a basis 
of human behavior have also been put forward by economists (see, for example, Tisdell, 
2013, Chs. 6 and 7 for a critical discussion of these arguments). 
Winterhalder and Kennett claim that the virtue of their approach is that it enables many 
different theories of the transition of Neolithic societies to agriculture to be integrated. 
Weisdorf’s (2005) analysis supports this claim. Winterhalder and Kennett (2009; 2006) 
single out marginal values, optimization, opportunity costs, risk-sensitive behavior, 
discounting, transaction costs and economies of scale as highly promising concepts for 
analyzing the evolution of Neolithic societies, but do not provide detailed applications 
of these concepts in these papers. 
 
 
 
 
Nevertheless, specific applications of human behavioral ecology are available. Several 
early applications are given, for example, in Winterhalder and Smith (1981) where the 
main emphasis is on general features of hunting-gathering strategies of foragers, taking 
into account selected measures of costs and benefits of alternative strategies. However, 
it is probably less difficult to apply behavioral ecology to this particular subject than to 
the determinants of transition of foraging societies to agriculture. Yet, even in this case, 
human behavioral ecology seems to give insufficient attention to cultural influences on 
the behavior of foragers, as is apparent from the studies of Bird-David (1992). While 
the influence of the cultural dimension on human behavior has been taken into account 
by very few economists (conventional institutionalists, such as Veblen, 1934, being 
exceptions) most mainstream economists ignore this factor in their analysis, and 
Weisdorf (2005) is no exception. This is because Weisdorf’s contribution to explaining 
the evolution of Neolithic societies relies on neoclassical microeconomic modelling.  
Weisdorf (2005, p. 568) points out that many archaeologists and anthropologists have 
used economic concepts (at least, implicitly) to explain the occurrence of the Neolithic 
Revolution (that is, the commencement of agriculture) but few economists have done 
likewise ‘despite its [the Neolithic Revolution’s] tremendous impact on economic 
growth and the wealth of nations.’ This revolution eventually resulted in most societies 
depending heavily on agriculture for their economic welfare, enabled increased 
urbanization to occur, and provided essential preconditions for the Industrial 
Revolution, for example, by supplying food for industrial workers. It is, therefore, little 
wonder that Physiocrats, such as Quesnay (Kuczynski and Meek, 1972), regarded 
agriculture as the prime source of economic wealth. 
It should be noted that it is widely agreed in the literature about the Neolithic 
Revolution that there is heterogeneity in adoption of agriculture and pastoralism by 
different Neolithic societies. Such heterogeneity has been explained empirically (Pryor, 
2004), theoretically (Svizzero and Tisdell, 2014b) and by a combination of both 
approaches (Thurnwald, 1932). For instance, according to the integrationist approach 
(Zvelebil, 2001), the adoption of agriculture by European hunter-gatherers has followed 
different patterns, depending on the period and region considered. Furthermore, some 
hunter-gatherers decided not to adopt agriculture, while others have switched to a low-
 
 
 
 
level food production, that is, to a mixed economy based on foraging and farming 
(Smith, 2001; Svizzero and Tisdell, 2015), or to other rural combinations for obtaining a 
livelihood (Thurnwald, 1932). 
The purpose of this article is to examine the analysis of Weisdorf (which entails the use 
of marginal values, optimization and the neoclassical approach to economic choices) 
and then consider the scope for applying the concepts which Winterhalder and Kennett 
single out for special mention, several of which are apparent in Weisdorf’s analysis. 
Alternative behavioral approaches are also given consideration, such as satisficing types 
of behavior. Moreover, particular attention is given to social embedding as a constraint 
on economic change and to non-marginal limitations to economic evolution. 
2. Weisdorf’s (2005) Analysis of the Transition from Foraging to Agriculture 
Examined 
The type of standardized model used by Weisdorf (2005) to explain different reasons 
for the transition of hunting-gathering societies to agriculture is shown in Figure 1. He 
uses it to illustrate three types of theories which have been proposed for the shifting of 
Neolithic societies to agriculture. These types include explanations based on increased 
populations, on the falling relative productivity of hunting-gathering, or on the rising 
relative productivity of agriculture. In these cases, the comparative economic benefit of 
engaging in some agriculture increases. In Figure 1, the line marked AB represents the 
marginal physical productivity of labor used in hunting and gathering and that marked 
BC in the marginal physical productivity of labor engaged in agriculture which, for 
simplicity, Weisdorf assumes to be constant. Nevertheless, it is not only for simplicity 
that Weisdorf assumes that the regional productivity of labor employed in early 
agriculture is constant. He is also of the view that fertile land was plentiful relative to 
the level of the Neolithic populations initially contemplating the adoption of agriculture 
as an option and so, the marginal productivity of agriculture for these populations was 
actually constant.  
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Weisdorf’s standard model with minor presentational adjustment. 
 
Given the relationship shown in Figure 1, a hunter-gatherer society has no economic 
incentive to commence agricultural production unless its labor force (proxy for 
population size, which is assumed to be a constant multiple of the size of the labor 
force) exceeds L2. If, for example, its available units of labor increase from L1 to L3, this 
society finds it economic to switch from total reliance on foraging for its livelihood to 
using L3– L2 of its available units of labor in agricultural production and L2 in hunting 
and gathering. It begins to rely on agriculture to a limited extent for its livelihood. 
Furthermore, this theory predicts that, all other things being held constant, an increase 
in the productivity of labor in agricultural production or a reduction in marginal 
physical yields from foraging will result in a higher proportion of its units of labor being 
engaged in agriculture. In the former case, the line MPA shifts upwards and in the latter 
case the line MPHG moves downwards. At first sight, this seems to be a straightforward 
and convincing approach to explaining the transition of hunter-gatherers to agriculture. 
However, closer consideration of the theory reveals some unresolved issues.  
First, it is widely accepted (see Lee and Daly, 2004, p. 4; Thurnwald, 1932) that sharing 
of the product was the norm in most foraging societies. If so, economic decisions in 
such societies seem more likely to have been based on the average product available to 
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tribal members than on their marginal product. Consequently, the total product may not 
have been maximized for the amount of labor used and switching to agriculture would 
have been delayed compared to Weisdorf’s prediction.  
Secondly, it is possible that when it initially began, agriculture was a communal activity 
involving sharing by tribal members, that is, it was a primitive form of communism, 
even though this did not continue once agriculture was able to yield a significant 
surplus. Therefore, adapting Weisdorf’s standard diagram, the representation shown in 
Figure 2 appears to be more relevant. 
In Figure 2, the relationship AFC represents the average product of labor. No labor is 
engaged in agriculture in this case unless the labor force exceeds L3. For example, if the 
available number of units of labor become L4 and the tribal band is guided by average 
product, L4– L3 of labor would be allocated to agriculture. Nevertheless, it is clear that 
there would be more to share in circumstances depicted by Figure 2 with a switch of 
some human activity hours to agriculture before L3 is reached. This switch may not 
occur since decision-makers may confuse marginal and average productivity or be only 
aware of the latter. However, it is possible after some agricultural production begins that 
L3– L2 of labor would be withdrawn from foraging to work in agriculture because it 
may become evident that the productivity of these units would be higher in agriculture. 
This would increase the total product and the average level of income available to tribal 
members. It would result in L4– L2 units of labor being allocated to agriculture, thereby 
maximizing the output of the society relative to its effort. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Early Neolithic societies may have based their production choices on 
average rather than marginal productivity because of the prevalence of 
sharing by community members. Given Weisdorf’s analysis, this could 
have delayed (as is illustrated) their transition to agriculture. 
 
Note that both Weisdorf’s model and the satisficing model represented in Figure 2 do 
not imply that there was an abrupt transition to agriculture in the Neolithic period. Both 
imply the existence initially of mixed economy with hunting and gathering being the 
dominant source of livelihoods in the initial transition. Over time, labor productivity in 
foraging probably declined while that in agriculture (and pastoralism) increased. 
Boserup (1965) gives reasons why agricultural productivity is likely to have trended 
upward once it started. Given these trends, one might expect that in many ancient 
communities, agriculture would have increasingly displaced hunting and gathering as a 
means of subsistence.  
The above theory needs further development (which is done when Figure 3 is 
introduced) because it does not adequately explain why the ‘tipping’ point for 
commencing some agriculture should be when per capita income falls to the level OS. 
Other tipping points are possible and can be expected to depend on the nature of 
income-sharing in tribal communities and their social structures. The importance of 
both these aspects have been stressed by Thurnwald (1932) and Polanyi (1944) but are 
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overlooked in the neoclassical economic theory applied by Weisdorf (2005). The main 
purpose of the simple exposition given in Figure 3 is to demonstrate that income-
sharing arrangements can significantly influence communal tribal decisions about 
whether or not to engage in agriculture and the timing of such decisions.  
Note that the adoption of satisficing types of behavior does not necessarily result in 
irrational behavior. Adoption of this type of behavior can be a deliberate choice and can 
result in well-reasoned and purposive actions when aspiration levels are unmet or if it is 
anticipated that they are going to be unmet. This behavior can, therefore, be consistent 
with Elster’s description of what constitutes rational behavior (Elster, 1984). 
Nevertheless, as was demonstrated the behavioral implications of satisficing models 
differ from those of the optimizing model realized by Weisdorf (2005). However, both 
the satisficing model outlined above and Weisdorf’s model should be regarded as 
special cases. This is because, given the theories of Thurnwald (1932), and his empirical 
observations, and the theory of Polanyi (1944), the occurrence of economic change and 
innovation depend on the way in which individuals and economic functions are 
embedded in social structures. Particularly in tribal communities, there can be 
considerable differences in the nature of this embedment between different tribes, and 
as stressed by Polanyi, its nature can alter with the passage of time, usually slowly. 
Modern market economies are, in fact, embedded in a different set of social structures 
than ancient economies. While neoclassical models are capable of capturing the nature 
of economic change in modern market economies, they may be of limited or no value 
for doing this when applied to tribal situations. 
Given the social embedding perspective, it is also necessary to relate satisficing models 
to the social structure of ancient societies. For example, how and who decided what 
levels of income for a tribe were socially unacceptable or in danger of becoming so? 
How was the intention for economic change socially determined and how were the 
pathways for economic change selected? Clearly, the processes involved were not 
straightforward. According to Thurnwald (1932, p. 275), innovation in tribal 
communities depends on the attitudes of their leaders to economic change. Therefore, 
they would be crucial players in determining the income threshold which becomes a 
trigger for economic innovation.  
 
 
 
 
At the same time, they may have been aware that economic innovation often alters the 
social structure of society, changes power and distributional relationships, and 
jeopardizes the social cohesion of a tribe. To what extent did they act in their role as 
tribal leaders to foster their own self-interest rather than the communal interest? To 
what extent were they limited in their behavior by established customs and codes? 
These questions are all relevant to considering the genesis of economic innovation 
required for transition from hunting and gathering to agriculture in ancient societies but 
are not considered in the theory proposed by Weisdorf. 
Second, because Weisdorf (2005) relies primarily on neoclassical microeconomic 
analysis, he assumes that lack of knowledge does not prevent decisions being made 
which maximize income per capita. This assumes that decision-makers have a 
considerable amount of knowledge about economic relationships. In reality, however, 
most early hunter-gatherers would have been very uncertain about their comparative 
returns from adopting agriculture. Presumably, they needed to learn about the value of 
adopting agriculture by experimentation and by learning-by-doing, both of which are 
not costless activities. Therefore, since it is usually assumed that there were no markets 
(or well developed ones) in early Neolithic times, the option of engaging in 
decentralized information-efficient decision-making of the type eloquently described by 
Hayek (1948) did not exist. Lack of knowledge about production possibilities and 
surrounding uncertainty (especially about the prospects of agriculture) presumably had a 
major impact on the decision-making of Neolithic tribes about the adoption of 
agriculture. 
Depending on their geographical situation and the stock of potential domesticates 
available, the risks faced by Neolithic communities in experimenting with agriculture 
would have varied. For example, in areas having fertile soils and regular availability of 
water for watering gardens, the risk of experimenting with agriculture might have been 
low, especially if agricultural products (and other products) could be stored. In addition, 
the comparative risks and variability of returns from foraging and agriculture would 
have presumably been taken into account. Thurnwald (1932) emphasized the 
importance of both the availability of natural resources and social structures as 
influences on economic innovations in tribal communities.  
 
 
 
 
The question also needs to be considered of the extent to which an incremental or 
marginal transition to agriculture was economically feasible. The successful cultivation 
of most plants requires their constant management in a particular location. Even the 
location of shifting agriculture is fixed for a period of time. Where tribal groups needed 
to range over a large territory to obtain sufficient produce for their subsistence, settling 
in one location by a tribe (or settlement by a significant portion of it) in order to engage 
in agriculture would have been problematic because those involved in farming would 
have had limited available produce from foraging to supplement their income from 
agriculture. Consequently, in this case, the scope for gradually relinquishing hunting 
and gathering in order to depend increasingly on agriculture would have been quite 
limited. In addition, in these circumstances, farmers have had limited social security 
(their safety net was weak) because they lacked access to sufficient amount of hunting-
gathering resources for their use in the event of a crop failure. They faced a similar 
problem in the latter case, to that identified by Chambers (1987) as occurring among 
some of the rural poor in developing countries. In cases where relatively abundant 
produce could be had from hunting and gathering in close proximity to an agricultural 
settlement, this would, however, not have been a serious problem. 
In some cases, ‘lumpiness of choices’ or high overhead costs, or social obstacles to 
reaching transit agreement to agriculture may have restricted the scope for incremental 
(marginal) switching to agriculture by foragers. For example, the whole tribe or a major 
portion of it may have had initially to agree to such a transition if it involved settlement 
and some major capital works may have been needed, such as the clearing of vegetation. 
Because of the existence of overhead costs, transition to agriculture of a sufficiently 
large magnitude might have been needed to recoup these costs, that is, to achieve 
economies of size. When incremental adjustment was not practical, this would have 
been a deterrent to the adoption of agriculture. Boserup (1965) makes it clear that 
overhead costs and the need for learning-by-doing (and in many cases communal 
cooperation) can be significant barriers to agricultural development in ‘primitive’ 
economies. 
Other factors that can also contribute to the lumpiness of choices in switching from 
hunting-gathering to agriculture is that if a small group from a tribe switches to 
 
 
 
 
agriculture and to a settled way of life, it may fail to reproduce itself, as is evident from 
the Allee effect (Courchamp et al., 2008). Furthermore, a small group is likely to be 
more vulnerable to being wiped out by invaders than a large group. This all suggests 
that the likely success of an initial agricultural settlement probably depends on its size. 
The problems identified previously lead us to identify another limitation of Weisdorf’s 
approach, namely the fact that cultural influences on decision making are ignored. 
Indeed, it seems – at least implicitly - from the reading of Weisdorf’s paper that the 
primitive society is viewed from the perspective of a corporate entrepreneur or socialist 
central planner deciding where best to allocate 'human resources' whose identity is 
unchanged under different uses. However, it is possible that in some primitive 
economies a switch by part of the tribe to agriculture would be unthinkable in normal 
circumstances because of the importance of one's productive role to one's social identity 
in such societies (Thurnwald, 1932).  
Both Thurnwald (1932) and Polanyi (1944), see also Polanyi in Dalton (1971), argue 
that economic activities of individuals are primarily determined by the constraints of 
social structures unlike in modern market economies. Finley (1999) adopts a similar 
point of view. Therefore, economic change and innovation must be related to social 
structures, customs and codes of behavior. This differs radically from the approach 
taken by Weisdorf. Also satisficing behavior by tribal groups should be similarly 
analyzed, as is considered later in this article. 
More recently it has been argued that modern market economies are embedded in social 
institutions but that the socially accepted behaviors differ from those in earlier societies. 
For example, Gowdy and Krall (2013; 2014) claim that market economies exhibit 
ultrasociality. Furthermore, they are of the view that ultrasociality became 
(increasingly) more marked following the commencement of agriculture. Their view is 
at odds with the hypothesis of Polanyi and Thurnwald that social embedding was more 
marked in ancient societies than in modern market economies. 
Despite their appropriate emphasis on the importance of social structures as an influence 
on economic behaviors and the operation of economics, theories of economic 
embedding as proposed by Polanyi and by some other economic anthropologists, appear 
 
 
 
 
to suffer from a significant limitation because they do not adequately answer the 
following question: If ancient economies and the behavior of individuals were as deeply 
embedded in existing social structures and cultural constraints, as is claimed, why and 
how did they manage to evolve? While some such societies displayed little or no social 
and economic evolution, it is clear that many did evolve, albeit in different ways and 
with different rates of change. It seems that on a global scale, social and economic 
evolution was at first slow but subsequently accelerated. Presumably, forces of circular 
causation played an important role in this evolutionary process; economic change 
resulted in altered social structures and changed social structures influenced economic 
change and innovation. These processes are not adequately considered in the theories of 
the economic anthropologists just considered, and are not taken into account at all by 
Weisdorf. 
Another limitation of Weisdorf’s (2005) model is that it does not consider the trade-off 
between work and leisure. Weisdorf appears to assume the effort and time spent by each 
‘laborer’ is unchanged whether or not they are engaged in foraging or in agriculture. 
The available evidence, however, indicates that this was probably not so in practice.  
The question of whether and to what extent, Neolithic societies aimed for economic 
optimization is also contentious. Weisdorf’s (2005) modelling implies that they 
maximized output relative to their effort. However, it is unclear in his analysis for what 
length of time output was maximized relative to effort. In some cases, productivity 
would have been different in the short run and in the long run. How much foresight was 
displayed by hunter-gatherers? 
Some scholars (for example, Sahlins, 1974; Gowdy, 1998; Sahlins, 1968) contend that 
not all Neolithic social groups were maximizers, some were satisficers. In these 
circumstances, the latter groups may have displayed a high degree of social inertia. 
Provided they were satisfied with their actual level of income (and did not aspire to a 
higher one), they would have had little or no incentive to adopt techniques or production 
methods which could increase their productivity. For example, they might have had no 
incentive to switch to agriculture in this case even if it could raise their productivity. 
They would only consider such a switch if given their current practices, they were 
unable to realize the level of income to which they aspired. Nevertheless, two different 
 
 
 
 
types of behaviors can be displayed by satisficers. Some groups of satisficers may wait 
until their aspiration level is not being met before they react. They may then search for 
possibilities that will once again enable them to reach their aspiration level or adjust 
their aspiration level downwards or do both. Their behavioral approach is reactive. 
Others may anticipate or predict the possibility that their aspiration level will not be met 
and take remedial action in advance. Their behavior is proactive. 
Figure 3 illustrates a situation in which satisficers do not adopt agriculture even though 
its adoption would increase their income. In Figure 3, the ‘kinked’ relationship AFC 
represents the (envelope of) average product available to a Neolithic tribe. The segment 
AG is the average product available if the tribe relies only on foraging (to employ its 
units of labor) and the portion FC indicates the tribe’s average product and marginal 
product from embarking on agriculture. Assume that the aspirational and minimum 
acceptable satisfactory level of income per head for the tribe is y1. In other words, an 
income level per head of y1 or greater (a threshold value) is regarded as satisfactory by 
the tribe. Also suppose that L1units of labor are available. Then, by engaging only in 
hunting and gathering, the tribe can obtain an income per head of y2. This exceeds their 
minimum satisfactory level of income, y1, but does not maximize the tribe’s income per 
head. To maximize the tribe’s income per head, some labor needs to be employed in 
agriculture. For example, by employing L1– L0 units of labor in agriculture, the tribe’s 
income per head would increase to y3. However, a tribe will not choose this income-
raising option (nor the output-maximizing one, which would require the marginal 
productivity of labor to be equal for both foraging and agriculture) if it is satisfied with 
an income per head of y2. Should, however, the tribe’s population increase beyondL�, it 
will be unable to obtain a satisfactory level of income. As a result, the tribe is likely to 
begin to search for opportunities which will increase its productivity or it may reduce its 
aspiration level of income. Both reactions may, of course, occur. The tribe may be 
inclined to commence agriculture in response to being stressed because it does not 
obtain a satisfactory level of income.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3: An illustration of income-satisficing behavior and its influence on the 
choice between foraging and agriculture. 
 
In Weisdorf’s (2005) modelling, the level of population is assumed to be a constant 
multiple of the available units of labor. Both the number of available units of labor and 
the level of population are treated as an exogenous variable. Therefore, there is scope to 
extend Weisdorf’s analysis by considering influences on the size of the population and 
the labor force. For example, Childe (1965) suggests that in agriculture the demand for 
labor is likely to be greater than in foraging and this favors population increase. Settled 
agriculture (that is a settled lifestyle) makes it less burdensome for a tribe to rear 
children. Caring for children is more burdensome given the nomadic lifestyle of hunting 
and gathering than it is given the sedentary lifestyle of agriculturalists. More 
importantly, children of agriculturalists contribute substantially more to food production 
than do the children of hunter-gatherers. Therefore, having children was less costly for 
early agriculturalists than for hunter-gatherers. Furthermore, food production per unit of 
land eventually increased after agriculture commenced and this triggered the first 
demographic explosion in history (Guzman and Weisdorf, 2011; Childe, 1965; Locay, 
1989). 
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Guzman and Weisdorf (2011) present a model based on the economic optimizing 
decisions of a representative agent to explain why the development of agriculture in 
Neolithic times stimulated economic growth. This is an ‘as if’ model which makes no 
allowance for behavioral diversity of different tribes due to varied social structures. The 
extent to which it mirrors reality is not obvious. The idea of a representative agent 
seems rather fictitious. It assumes away principal-agent problems and fails to take 
account of the influence of social relationships on decision-making in societies and their 
consequences for economic development. This type of economic optimization approach 
fails to explain why some tribes did not adopt agriculture (or delayed it adoption) when 
they knew about it and could have increased their income levels by adopting it. 
Consequently, this placed them eventually in most cases at a competitive economic 
disadvantage with successful earlier adopters of agriculture.  
After agriculture commenced, the social structures of many communities adopting it 
altered. Some types of agricultural development in the second stage of the Neolithic 
Revolution, as identified by Childe (1965),enabled palace-dominated societies to 
emerge and these were accompanied by ruling elites. As suggested by Childe (1965), 
and as further considered by Tisdell and Svizzero (2015) and Svizzero and Tisdell 
(2014a), these elites may well have attempted to extract the maximum level of 
economic surplus from their subjects. Therefore, the communities involved became 
embedded in a different set of social and economic relationships than those prevailing in 
their preceding tribal situations, and the dynamics of economic development changed in 
ways suggested by Tisdell and Svizzero (2015) and Svizzero and Tisdell (2014a). 
Although Weisdorf’s (2005) model does help to integrate various theories of why many 
Neolithic societies adopted agriculture or failed to do so, it does not provide a 
sufficiently general framework to encompass the wider range of behavioral patterns that 
presumably existed in different Neolithic societies, and which influenced the nature of 
social and economic evolution. Apart from the likelihood that different Neolithic 
societies adopted different decision-making procedures, neoclassical microeconomic 
modelling fails to take sufficient account of the bounded rationality and the social 
constraints involved in such societies in deciding whether to transit from foraging to 
agriculture. 
 
 
 
 
3. Economic Concepts and Human Behavioral Ecology 
As mentioned earlier in this article, Winterhalder and Kennett (2009; 2006) are strong 
advocates of the use of microeconomic concepts to explain the transition of foraging 
societies to agriculture, and they have identified a set of such concepts which they 
believe are very promising in this respect. Concepts identified by them as important 
include economic optimization and opportunity costs (relative economic benefits). 
These are central concepts in Weisdorf’s (2005) analysis. However, as the above 
discussion reveals, these concepts seem to be incapable of explaining the adoption or 
non-adoption of agriculture by all Neolithic societies which were in a position to 
increase their levels of income by engaging to some extent in agricultural production. 
Furthermore, these authors mention that decision-making based on marginalism or 
incrementalism is important. However, it seems that(at least, in some cases) the 
marginal adoption of agriculture was not a realistic option for all groups of foragers, 
because a discrete change in their social and economic organization was required. This 
was illustrated above as involving a ‘lumpiness’ problem or as entailing significant 
overhead or initial costs. Boserup (1965) provides examples of this problem. 
Winterhalder and Kennett (2006) identify optimization, marginal values, opportunity 
costs, discounting and risk-sensitive behavior as important concepts in considering the 
livelihood decisions of Neolithic societies. In Winterhalder and Kennett (2009), they 
add economies of scale and transaction costs to this list. We have already brought 
attention to possible limitations of the first three concepts in considering Weisdorf’s 
analysis of the transition of Neolithic societies to agriculture. It should also be observed 
that in adding economies of scale as a significant concept to their list, Winterhalder and 
Kennett restrict the scope for marginal or incremental change. This is because 
economies of scale can act as a barrier to entry to agriculture or to new forms of 
livelihood. This is because transition must often be on a large enough scale to be 
economic and this also tends to increase the degree of risk involved in trying it.  
Compared to foraging, agriculture involves a longer delay before an economic return is 
obtained after effort is expended than does foraging. This is likely to retard the adoption 
of agriculture. Furthermore, in most cases, agriculture requires a larger regular 
 
 
 
 
investment than foraging. This was true in immediate-return foraging societies in which 
food was consumed on the spot or soon after. However, in delayed-return foraging 
societies, food and other resources might be stored for months or years with marked 
effects on social organization and cultural notions of property (Woodburn, 1982). The 
adoption of agriculture involved delayed economic returns and a larger investment 
compared to foraging. Presumably, some discounting of delayed economic returns in 
relation to the required investment was taken into account by Neolithic decision-
makers. However, it is difficult to know in retrospect the level of the discount rate and 
what determined it in such societies. It is also probable that the (social) discount rate 
differed within, as well as between, tribes or bands. One would expect that those groups 
having a high discount rate (high rate of time-preference) would be less inclined to 
adopt agriculture than those with a lower discount rate, other things being held constant.  
This is evidenced by Tucker (2007, p. 204).He uses an experiment to estimate the 
discount rate (the rate of time preference) of Mikea hunter-gatherers-horticulturalists 
currently living in southwestern Madagascar where plans to create a Mikea Forest 
National Park began with the elimination of slash-and-burn maize agriculture and the 
encouragement to plant labor-intensive manioc instead. Time preference – which is 
typically described by a discount rate - refers to how one judges the value of a smaller 
reward available immediately versus a larger reward available after a delay. The result 
of the experiment was the following one : “Of 81 adults asked how they would cope 
with the elimination of maize in 2003 and 2004, only about half (N=41) said that they 
planned to become manioc farmers; the remainder said they planned to specialize on 
foraging and fishing (N=37) or market activities (N=3)”, (Tucker, 2007, p. 196). 
One associated issue is the length of time taken into account by Neolithic societies in 
choosing development strategies. How long were their planning horizons? How myopic 
were they in choosing their development strategies and how realistic were they in 
assessing possibilities? Human behavioral ecology focuses on the costs and benefits 
associated with individual-level subsistence decisions in localized ecological settings. 
When it is considered in its simple formulation, this approach to human behavior 
corresponds to a basic pattern of "pursuit of pleasure - avoidance of pain". However this 
leaves open the question of how much time is (or should be) spent on trying to 
 
 
 
 
maximize net pleasure. Too much time spend doing this can reduce total pleasure and 
have other negative consequences as pointed out by Earl (2013). Earl (2013) argues that 
‘excessive’ deliberation by hunting and gathering tribes would have had a negative 
effect on their biological fitness. He maintains that sensory rewards serves an 
evolutionary role by diverting people from thinking too much about what they are doing 
in situations in which deliberation might interfere with survival or reproduction. (Earl, 
2013, p. 1263) 
Furthermore, Winterhalder and Kennett (2009)stress the need to take account of risk-
sensitive behaviors in considering the transition of hunter-gatherers to agriculture but 
point out that little research has been done on this aspect. Presumably, geographical 
areas which had suitable natural endowments for agriculture (such as fertile soils, a 
stable climate and ready and reliable availability of water for watering crops) would 
have reduced the risks associated with transition. In addition, the ability to store food 
would have provided a safeguard against lower than expected crop yields. River valleys 
in the Middle East may have had natural resource endowments which reduced the risks 
of transition to agriculture compared with less suitable environments in early Neolithic 
times. In some areas of the Middle East, once a food surplus was obtained, it may have 
become economic to establish olive trees, grape vines, leguminous shrubs (chick peas) 
and other food perennials that took longer than annuals to bear edible food but which 
were also less reliant on natural conditions needed for the successful cultivation of 
annuals such as wheat and barley. 
An additional concept identified by Winterhalder and Kennett (2009, p. 647) as being 
important in understanding the economic evolution of Neolithic societies is transaction 
costs. Transaction costs are important in influencing the extent to which exchange takes 
place. Exchange is, as a rule, facilitated by lower transaction costs. Lower transaction 
costs can arise for several reasons. These include lower transport costs, greater trust and 
certainty between the parties involved in exchange, and increased knowledge of the 
possibilities for exchange. Childe (1950) points out that cities which grew up along 
rivers and navigable waterways in the Middle East were well placed to facilitate 
regional exchange of goods, because of their comparatively low level of transaction 
costs required for exchange of commodities. Trade can be an important factor in 
 
 
 
 
increasing national wealth and in reducing local economic risks. Presumably, the 
development of writing also facilitated trade because it allowed contracts to be specified 
in written form, thereby reducing uncertainty. Several of the clay tablets (based on 
cuneiform) in ancient Sumeria recorded contracts for exchange in commodities. 
4. Discussion 
There is little doubt that the use of economic concepts can help us to better understand 
the economic evolution of Neolithic societies and the failure of some to shift to 
agriculture from hunting-gathering. However, the range of microeconomic models is 
wide and not all assume optimizing behavior by individuals or groups. It is clear that 
Neolithic societies varied considerably in their social organization of production 
possibilities(see, for example, Kelly, 1995). Consequently, neoclassical microeconomic 
models, such as those applied by Weisdorf (2005), most likely fail to predict the 
behaviors of all Neolithic societies in deciding whether or not to commence agriculture, 
even when agriculture could increase their productivity. 
Furthermore, it is uncertain what ancient societies were intent on optimizing and what 
their time-horizon and preferences for doing this were. How myopic were they in their 
decision-making and how realistic were they about their production possibilities? 
Testing for such past behavioral features seems to be a daunting task, especially in 
situations involving prehistory. Even written records may not provide reliable evidence 
of intent. This restricts the scientific basis for applying human behavioral ecology. 
The analysis of optimal behavior is a key feature of both mainstream economic 
modelling and behavioral ecology. However, in both cases, there is difficulty in 
deciding accurately on what is being maximized or minimized, that is identifying the 
relevant objective function, and there is a temptation to assume that a single variable is 
being maximized or minimized. For example, profit maximization by firms is a standard 
assumption in neoclassical economies, and maximizing net energy return to hunter-
gatherers in searching for food was an objective used by Winterhalder (1981) in his 
early analysis of optimal foraging strategies. In both cases, these theories can be 
unreliable guides to actual behavior and may fail to identify ‘successful’ 
 
 
 
 
behaviors(Tisdell, 2013, pp. 138-141). As the ecologist Marion Dawkins (1986, p. 21) 
stresses, efficient feeders may not be optimizers in a broad sense, because they may fail 
to pay adequate attention to predators and mating opportunities and therefore, are likely 
to be eliminated by natural selection. 
It could also be argued that Weisdorf’s (2005) model is a crude energy efficiency model 
because it implies that output is maximized relative to the amount of labor employed 
which is an indicator of human energy expended. At the same time, his model assumes 
that the quantities of all commodities supplied whether by foraging or by agriculture can 
be measured in a common unit, even though they are heterogeneous. Consequently, a 
valuation problem is side-stepped. Furthermore, valuation problems are not fully 
resolved in the optimal foraging models outlined by Winterhalder (1981). As agriculture 
developed and as foraging became a relatively less important source of food, 
presumably the bundle of commodities available to humans altered. Therefore, with 
development, all goods were probably less likely to be valued by humans on the basis of 
their relative energy content even if they were so valued by Neolithic societies relying 
entirely on foraging. However, taking into account the findings of Bird-David (1992), 
the valuation of commodities in foraging societies cannot be attributed entirely to their 
energy content, and maximizing net energy returns does not adequately explain the 
foraging strategies of all these societies. Bird-David provides specific examples of tribal 
groups who do not maximize their net energy returns from hunting and gathering 
because they take into account their social benefits from engaging in such activities. 
Furthermore, even in Neolithic societies, it seems unlikely that the utility of food to 
humans would have depended solely on its energy content, and consequently, the diet-
breadth model developed in ecology to explain hunting by animals is likely to have 
limited applicability to human behavior, despite the view of Winterhalder (1981). 
The extent to which rational choice (design) and chance determined the survival and 
economic well-being of ancient societies is not clear in retrospect. It might be thought 
that those who survived and prospered made optimal actual choices(see, for example, 
Smith and Winterhalder, 1992). However, it is also possible that many of the choices 
were chance events or not made based on rational optimizing procedures. In retrospect, 
there is a temptation to attribute the survival and superior economic growth of societies 
 
 
 
 
compared to those that have failed or which have experienced economic stagnation to 
the superior rationality of the former, that is in their ability to maximize their chances of 
survival and foster economic growth. This assumes that survival of the fittest depended 
on the fittest being optimizers. However, in reality, chance rather than rational 
optimization could have played a major role in the survival and economic growth of 
several societies which proved to be the fittest ex ante. Social Darwinism is a weak 
basis for contending in retrospect that the most successful surviving societies must have 
been forward-looking optimizers in the past. This is because this conclusion ignores the 
possibility that chance played an important role in the selection and survival of 
societies, as it also has done in the evolution of species (Gould, 1989; 1990). 
5. Concluding Comments 
Winterhalder and Kennett (2009, pp. 646-647), prominent advocates of human 
behavioral ecology, warn fellow anthropologists that economists are a danger because 
they ‘threaten to steal our subject matter with, intriguing ideas (Ofek, 2001), although 
without our empirical understanding of actual cases’. Furthermore, they contend that the 
‘analysis of the economy of early mixed or agricultural societies necessarily will 
employ terms with which they [economists] already are comfortable’(Winterhalder and 
Kennett, 2009, p. 647). While these claims may be correct, these authors appear not to 
fully appreciate the variety of behavioral theories which are being applied by 
economists and the need to develop many of these theories further in order to apply 
them to the evolution of early societies. For example, while the economic analysis of 
Weisdorf (2005) relies on economic optimization and opportunity costs to integrate 
many different theories, mostly of archaeologists and anthropologists, and to provide 
the rationale for the transition (and non-transition) of foraging societies to agriculture, 
another economist(with a background in anthropology), John Gowdy (1998), adopts a 
satisficing behavioral framework to explain why some foragers did not adopt 
agriculture. Gowdy (1998) argues that many hunter-gatherers had (have) limited wants 
in relation to their means, and therefore, had (have) no incentive to switch to 
agriculture. There are also other models of behavior, such as those of Ryan and Deci 
(2000) and Aunger and Curtis (2013), which could be relevant to this transition but 
which have yet to be applied to this issue.  
 
 
 
 
Why such societies adopted a satisficing rather than an optimizing approach to the 
economic change and the nature and dynamics of this satisficing behavior requires 
further consideration. Furthermore, apart from considering whether satisficing behavior 
is of a prospective or reactive nature, different types of apparent satisficing behavior 
need to be considered. For example, there are at least three types of circumstances 
which can give rise to behavior that appears to be of a satisficing nature. They are:  
1. decision-makers have low levels of aspiration in relation to the goals they seek;  
2. decision-makers are of the view that the cost of searching for choices which will 
improve outcomes is not worth the benefit; or  
3. in relation to commodities, a stage is reached where extra quantities of the 
available commodities are of no extra value or would cause disutility.  
In the latter case, a type of saturation is possible relative to the limited variety of 
commodities available to foragers, Case 1 would seem to fit Sahlins (1968) catch 
phrase, as identified by Bird-David (1992, p. 34), of ‘Want not, lack not’, but it does not 
exactly fit Bird-David’s alternative of ‘Think rich, be rich’ because such a group of 
foragers would be rich (and could be made no richer) given their economic universe.  
Lee (1998, p. ix) points out that ‘for most economists, the supremacy of the market, the 
sanctity of property, and the centrality of the doctrine of economic man are sacred tenets 
of their craft. Orthodoxies of this kind deserve careful scrutiny…’ although the concept 
of economic man has predictive value in some cases, it also has its limitations. Human 
behavioral ecologists need to pay greater attention to the limitations of the concept of 
economic man and should allow for a greater diversity of human behaviors (some of 
which are being revealed by advances in experimental and psychological economics) 
than those behaviors singled out by Winterhalder and Kennett(2006; 2009) for 
functional applications in anthropology.  
Weisdorf’s (2005) analysis shows how the (neoclassical) microeconomic theory of 
optimal decision-making could be used to explain the evolution of Neolithic societies, 
that is their transit to agriculture or their non-transit to it. Furthermore, application of his 
analysis can be extended, for example to explain why some foragers after adopting 
agriculture returned to depend solely on foraging for their subsistence. Nevertheless, 
 
 
 
 
this theory has not been tested and it leaves out of account several factors which appear 
to have been important influences on the behaviors of some Neolithic societies. Those 
identified in this article included cultural and knowledge factors, random influences on 
choice sets as well as the possible adoption by some societies of satisficing-like 
behavior. In our view, human (economic) behaviors are diverse, are significantly 
influenced by prevailing social structures as well as the nature of the possibilities for 
economic and social transformation and a single microeconomic model of the type 
proposed by Weisdorf fails to adequately capture the extent of this diversity. Therefore, 
on its own, it cannot satisfactorily explain the economic and social evolution of all 
Neolithic societies. A wider range of theories (ideal types) is needed to do this. 
Similarly the optimization models proposed by human behavioral ecologists seem to be 
too narrow in their perspective and they need also to be supplemented by additional 
theories. Although human behavioral ecologists have proposed specific optimization 
models to explain the possible foraging strategies of hunter-gatherers, they have not 
articulated the particular type of model developed by Weisdorf. Despite this, Weisdorf’s 
model is compatible with the type of approach favored by human behavioral ecologists. 
Behavioral ecologists may, however, feel that a worthwhile objective would be to 
extend his model taking into account those types of economic concepts which are 
identified by Winterhalder and Kennett (Winterhalder and Kennett, 2009; 2006) as 
promising. In doing this, some incompatibilities could arise. For example, in some 
cases, marginal changes in economic and social activities and structuring may be 
blocked by the occurrence of economies of scale and social impediments to economic 
change. 
Winterhalder and Kennett mostly rely on optimization and neoclassical microeconomic 
concepts, such as marginalism, to explain the behaviors of hunter-gatherers and their 
transition to agriculture. They also state that transaction costs could be relevant but do 
not give examples. Transaction costs are central to the theories of neo-institutionalism 
(Coase, 1937; Williamson, 1975) and reflect economic constraints arising from 
processes of social organization. Therefore, the economic concepts which Winterhalder 
and Kennett see as important for understanding the matters under investigation are 
wider than the set utilized by Weisdorf. Nevertheless, neo-institutional economics only 
considers narrow features of social embedding of human behavior. This is because at 
 
 
 
 
least three types of factors influence social embedding. These are:  
• Impediments arising from group (social) decision-making, such as transaction 
costs and problems of conflict resolution (see for example, Olson, 1965; Tisdell, 
1996, Ch. 8). 
• The extent of social (cultural) determination of human preferences. 
• The nature of social approval/disapproval of different types of human behavior. 
Weisdorf does not consider any of these factors in his theory and Winterhalder and 
Kennett recognize (1) but not (2) and (3). While Thurnwald and Polanyi stress the 
importance of cultural embedding, factor (2), they do not pay attention to (1) and do not 
give due consideration to the processes which bring about changes in (2) and (3). So we 
find that these theories either pay no attention to social embedding or only take into 
account limited features of social embedding of human behavior. Holistic theories need 
to take into account all of these factors. This, however, is a daunting task and may 
explain why all existing theories about the reasons for economic transition in relation to 
human behavior are partial in nature. 
Social embedding is clearly a complex phenomenon. Its depth depends on the structure 
of existing social organizations and methods of administration, communal customs and 
beliefs and ingrained social rituals. These are all potential barriers to economic 
evolution. They influence the social and individual transaction costs in bringing about 
major economic transitions. They also seem likely to limit the scope for exercising 
collective rationality in choosing economic development paths, especially rational 
behavior of the type associated with neoclassical economics. Although social 
embedding occurs in modern societies, we appear to be more aware of its presence in 
ancient and ‘primitive’ economies. D’Altroy (2015) for example, provides a 
considerable amount of information on the nature of social embedding in the Inca 
empire.  
In short, it has been argued that behavioral theories which rely on optimizing economic 
behavior and marginalism in order to explain the transition from hunting and gathering 
to agriculture are far too narrow. This is a result of their adoption of a partial 
reductionist approach to trying to explain socio-economic evolution. A larger picture is 
 
 
 
 
needed to explain the genesis of socio-economic change. Among other things, they 
overlook diverse forms of satisficing behavior and fail to take account of social 
embedding. As well, the dynamics of the ‘formation’ of behaviors and the presence of 
social irreversibilities (resulting in path-dependence and which can occur in processes 
of human development) are given no consideration. 
To conclude: In our view, social structures, the nature of economic activities and 
behaviors are interdependent. Therefore, they need to be simultaneously taken into 
account in theories of socio-economic evolution and in analyzing the nature of 
economic behaviors. It has been argued that to date microeconomic theories and those 
proposed in human behavioral ecology as well as those based on the extreme 
embedding of ancient economics in social structures provide incomplete explanations of 
the evolution of Neolithic societies. These theories are not yet satisfactory for reasons 
outlined in this article. Further work is needed to develop relevant theories which 
encompass the interdependent influences of both social and economic factors.9 
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